How Ukraine's F-16 Completely Change the War with Russia

F-16s are finally being sent to Ukraine, and the Fighting Falcon will go toe to toe with its Cold War rival- the Mig-29. The Mig-29 Fulcrum was developed in response to new American jets like the F-15 and F-16, and they would finally meet in the skies after German reunification. The East German air force retained a number of the Soviet-built Mig-29s, and these proved to be an intelligence goldmine for the west- who very quickly realized they'd overengineered the crap out of the F-15. But what about the F-16, the backbone of NATO forces? Was it a significant cut above the Mig-29 as well?

NATO would get its answer in May of 1995, when the 510th Fighter Squadron, of the 31st Fighter Wing based in Aviano, Italy, flew up against the Luftwaffe Jagdgeschwader 73 of the new unified German air force. The Fulcrums had been deployed to Decimomannu air base and presented an opportunity for mock air combat between the two fighters for the first time. The first thing to stand out to both sides was the Fulcrums' impressive low-speed maneuverability, compared by one of the American pilots to fighting an F-18 Hornet- however the Fulcrum, he noted, has a thrust advantage over the Hornet. That thrust advantage allowed the Fulcrums to regain energy faster, and made it more difficult for the smaller F-16 to exploit strategies it might employ against an F-18 where it forced it to trade speed for maneuverability.

The helmet mounted sight system of the Mig-29 proved a significant challenge to the F-16s though, who were forced to dump flares anytime they got within the forty-five-degree nose cone of the Mig-29. The helmet mounted sight was a significant game changer for fighter jets, and after Soviet Mig-21s and Mig-23s were downed by the South African air force using locally developed helmet mounted sights in the 1970s, the Soviet Union created a crash program to develop a counter to the South African tech. This would result in the helmet mounted display and a high off-boresight missile, the R-73. Fielded in 1985, the Mig-29 included both systems, allowing Soviet pilots to fire missiles in the direction they were physically turning their heads towards. This forty-five-degree cone gave the Mig-29 an immediate advantage over traditional fighters, which needed to keep their opponent within a much smaller, forward-facing cone of their own.

And it made the Mig-29 deadly in a dogfight. Coupled with its great thrust output and maneuverability, the Migs were proving to be a challenge for the F-16s. As told by Lt. Colonel Gary West, commander of the 510th, the Mig 29's helmet-mounted sight was seen as an insurmountable challenge in close quarters dogfighting, so the F-16s were better served avoiding it all together. However, the Americans quickly found ways of neutralizing the Soviet plane's advantage. The F-16, a smaller, lighter plane, enjoys a significant advantage at higher speeds, coupled with excellent maneuverability of its own. Thus, the Americans found that as long as they kept their airspeed at around 325 knots, they could outmaneuver the Mig-29s and negate the advantage of the helmet mounted sight. Once the Americans and Germans swapped planes, the weaknesses of the Mig-29 further came to light.

The plane was not nearly as nimble as the F-16, and its visibility is also terrible. An F-16 pilot sits high in the cockpit with a bubble canopy that gives them the ability to see 360 degrees around them. The meanwhile has much less visibility, in the words of one of the Fulcrum pilots, “Our visibility is not as good as an F-16 or even an F-15. We can’t see directly behind us. We have to look out the side slightly to see behind us, which doesn’t allow us to maintain a visual contact and an optimum lift vector at the same time. This shortcoming can be a real problem, especially when flying against an aircraft as small as the F-16.” The aircraft was formidable, but not a good dogfighter. As explained by the German operations officer of the Mig-29 squadron, the airplane was flown like a point defense interceptor, similar to the Mig-21.

Even though it could perform in a close-in dogfight, it wasn't designed for it, hence the canopy visibility issue. Instead, the Germans were trained by Soviet instructors to simply fly the plane as an interceptor- taking off, jettisoning the fuel tank, going supersonic, firing missiles, and then going home. This naturally was a significant flaw in Soviet air doctrine, which relegated its air forces to fighting long range skirmishes supported by ground-based air defenses. NATO forces meanwhile trained to achieve air superiority and then hold it. From a logistical point of view, it made sense- NATO had better aircraft with better avionics and sensors, and the Soviets knew that they would never win an air war if their air force went toe to toe with NATO's. However, by tying in ground-based air defenses and keeping the Soviet air force within range, the Soviet Union hoped to keep air space directly over the front lines relatively safe for ground forces. Ultimately this would prove a significant flaw with the revelation brought on by Desert Storm, when American forces executed their deep strike doctrine, flying deep behind the front lines to attack support and logistical targets, evading or destroying ground-based air defenses.

Then there's the recent revelations brought on by the war in Ukraine. To date, Russia has downed nearly as many of its own aircraft as Ukraine has. This is due to a lack of competency in operating ground-based air defenses alongside active air forces. In Desert Storm, the US and its allies operated hundreds of air defenses with thousands of aircraft over head, resulting in only a handful of friendly shootdowns. By comparison, Russia today is operating in a theater twice the size with about a quarter the aircraft and has suffered dozens of friendly shootdowns. This includes the incredible shoot down of four aircraft in one day inside of Russia's borders. The Soviet military was believed to be more competent than the modern Russian one, but there's significant doubts as to its true capabilities given the legacy it passed down to the Russian Federation. Back to the fight though. The American pilots found that the Mig-29 could be very dangerous in the initial stages of a tight dogfight, however soon the F-16's superior maneuverability and light weight could be used to gain the energy advantage. But that was in the mid-1990s, how would the Mig-29 fare today? A Polish pilot who has flown both the Mig-29 and F-16 recently spoke to media, stating that he would not like to fly the Mig-29 in real combat if given a choice. With 5 years’ experience in both aircraft, the Polish pilot pointed out that even small advantages add up to significant outcomes.

The F-16's cockpit was designed with pilot comfort in mind, with instruments laid out in a convenient way that makes flying the aircraft much easier on the pilot. In his own words, this type of design philosophy simply did not exist in the Soviet Union. Aircraft were built to utilitarian standards, and no thought was given to how a pilot's comfort- or even ease of operating the various instruments- could result in an advantage in a fight. Then again, the Soviets may have seen the Mig-29 as an interceptor meant to undertake 30-minute sorties, getting into the sky, shooting its missiles, and immediately going back home. The F-16 is also a much smarter aircraft. Its radar can track an engage multiple targets simultaneously, and its ability to link up to friendly tactical battle networks vastly improves the F-16's situational awareness. Friendly aircraft can feed each other information, and friendly platforms like AWACS can give the F-16 pilot an unprecedented picture of the battle space. Superior radar lets the F-16 find targets on its own, and engage them at long ranges.

The Mig-29 by comparison was completely reliant on ground radar controllers to find targets, with its own radar only suitable for a short-range fight and with the ability to only lock on and track a single target at a time. When the Polish pilot flew his Mig 29, he also never had the opportunity to utilize night vision goggles, while with the F-16s they are part of standard equipment. When it comes to self-defense, the Mig-29's radar warning receiver provides very little information to the pilot on a potential threat, making it difficult to ascertain what the threat is and how best to react to it. This significantly lowers pilot survivability. The plane is also not a multirole platform with day/night all-weather capabilities. Instead, the Mig-29 is mostly a fighter that can only engage in very limited air-to-ground support. According to the Polish pilot, while the Mig-29 was a significant aircraft in its time, it's now a ghost of a bygone era. The F-16 meanwhile is entirely designed for efficiency, and with modern upgrades has outpaced its old Cold War rival. It's hard to get a better endorsement than from a pilot who's spent five years flying each air frame, and the overall consensus is the same: the Mig-29 is well past its prime, and was never really a particularly good dogfighter anyways. The jet was much better suited for taking out bombers and other support aircraft before gunning it home as fast as possible.

Ultimately though, just how well Ukraine's F-16s perform against Russia's fleet of Mig-29s will depend on numbers- because even an inferior jet can win the day with enough support. Despite the Russian aerospace forces making a very weak showing in the war so far, they have numbers on their side. An intercepting flight of F-16s could easily be harassed at long range by superior numbers, forcing them to go on the defensive, and allowing the Mig-29s to close for the kill. This is why how Ukraine uses its F-16s matters- at least until the west makes good on Ukraine's request for 100 of the combat aircraft. With an estimated two dozen F-16s by early 2024, Ukraine is unlikely to use them for air interceptions, relying instead on ground-based air defenses for that job. Simply put, until its numbers go way up, Ukraine can't risk being outmanned in the sky. But the F-16 opens up a whole list of possibilities for Ukraine. First, unless its ability to network with NATO data links is removed before being transferred, Ukrainian F-16s will be able to directly plug into NATO AWACS and other platforms. This will give the aircraft incredible battlefield awareness, unsurpassed by the Russians.

With a constant flight of AWACS platforms along Ukraine's borders and in the Black Sea, NATO has been able to monitor nearly all of the air space inside the country and provide ample warning to Ukrainian pilots. NATO personnel have even confirmed that they've directly fed intelligence to Ukrainian aircraft which led to air-to-air kills. The big question though is if NATO will allow the incoming F-16s to keep their ability to network directly with NATO platforms. On one hand, this will make NATO a direct participant in the war in a brand new, more worrisome capacity- NATO platforms could literally guide NATO weapons fired by Ukrainian pilots in NATO planes to their targets. This is a significant step that NATO may not be comfortable taking. On the other hand, though, fuck Russia. The F-16 also throws the door wide open on the types of weapons that Ukraine will be able to employ against Russian forces. To date, a significant inventory of long-range weapons has been unavailable to Ukraine because of a lack of launch platforms. The F-16 is built to carry any weapon in the NATO inventory, and its electronic brains can make maximum use of it.

While American engineers pulled off a McGyver type fix to allow Ukrainian Migs to fly with American HAARM missiles, the Ukrainians were unable to make full use of the HAARM's capabilities due to a lack of interfacing between the weapon and plane. This is no longer a concern. HAARMS carried by F-16s will be able to provide their pilots with much greater data, and enjoy far greater effectiveness and precision. The Ukrainians will also be able to fly a large number of party favorites, such as the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, a precision bomb that disperses a large number of bomblets over a target area. They'll also be able to employ JDAMs, which the US can supply on the cheap and in great numbers. Basically, every weapon in the US inventory suddenly becomes game for Ukraine- it's great, the Russians are going to have a literal blast.

And ultimately, Ukraine's small F-16 fleet is probably best used to directly support ground forces rather than try to achieve air superiority. Until the nation has a significant number of Falcons, the aircraft is best used to deliver a devil's cocktail of precision weapons directly onto Russian front lines. If Russian morale is low now, wait until precision cluster munitions begin raining from the skies in large number. F-16s for Ukraine though are important for something else altogether- they represent a long-term commitment to the security of Ukraine. Combat aircraft require a significant logistics tail which is being established right now for Ukraine's fighters, and this is not something that can be set up overnight or is cheap to establish. Thus, America agreeing to the transfer of F-16s signals its commitment to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. If Putin thought he'd be able to outlast the west, he bet wrong. F-16s will also begin the process of standardizing Ukraine's military with NATO's, a significant step forward to actual NATO membership. The US is looking to the future and is setting up the groundwork that will help transform the Ukrainian military into an armed force that can be easily integrated into NATO- both for continued support, and for continued security once Putin accepts his war was over the moment his forces failed to take Kyiv in three days.